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Since the [relativity] postulate comes to mean that only the four-dimensional
world in space and time is given by phenomena, but that the projection in
space and in time may still be undertaken with a certain degree of freedom,
I prefer to call it the postulate of the absolute world.
H. Minkowski [1, p. 83]
The basic idea is to present the essentials of relativity from the Minkowskian
point of view, that is, in terms of the geometry of space-time... because it is
to me (and I think to many others) the key which unlocks many mysteries.
My ambition has been to make space-time a real workshop for physicists,
and not a museum visited occasionally with a feeling of awe.
J. L. Synge [2, p. vii]
1 Introduction
A hundred years have passed since the advent of special relativity and 2008
will mark another important to all relativists anniversary – one hundred years
since Minkowski gave his talk “Space and Time” on September 21, 1908 in
which he proposed the unification of space and time into an inseparable entity
– spacetime. Although special relativity has been an enormously successful
physical theory no progress has been made in clarifying the question of exis-
tence of the objects represented by two of its basic concepts – spacetime and
worldlines (or worldtubes in the case of extended bodies). The major reason
for this failure appears to be the physicists’ tradition to call such questions
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of existence philosophical. This tradition, however, is not quite consistent.
In Newtonian mechanics physicists believe that they describe real objects
whenever they talk about particles – one of the basic concepts of Newtonian
physics. The situation is the same in quantum physics – no one questions
the existence of electrons, protons, etc. Then why should the question of ex-
istence of worldtubes (representing particles in relativity) be regarded as a
philosophical question?
The most probable answer a physicist would give is that the concepts of
spacetime and worldtubes belong to the four-dimensional representation of
special relativity, whereas in its three-dimensional formulation these concepts
are not used. Since both representations of special relativity are equivalent
it appears that one should not worry about the existence of spacetime and
worldtubes. Most physicists and especially relativists appear to believe that by
emphasizing the equivalence of the three- and four-dimensional descriptions of
the world provided by special relativity the issue of the existence of spacetime
has been shown to be a non-issue. However, as we will see that would be quite
a premature attempt to close such a fundamental issue.
The three- and four-dimensional representations of special relativity are
equivalent, but I think it is a valid question to ask which of them is the
adequate description of the world. One is naturally tempted to immediately
question the validity of such a question by pointing out that these are just two
descriptions and to ask which is the right one is meaningless. For instance,
one could explain that such a question is as meaningless as to ask whether
the Newtonian or the Lagrangian formulation of classical mechanics is more
adequate. Once again this situation clearly demonstrates that each case in sci-
ence (and not only in science) should be dealt with separately. The equivalence
of the two representations of special relativity are drastically different from
the equivalence of the Newtonian and Lagrangian formulations of classical
mechanics. The three-dimensional formulation of special relativity represents
reality as a three-dimensional world which evolves in time, whereas according
to the four-dimensional formulation the world is four-dimensional with time
entirely given as the forth dimension. As the world is either three-dimensional
or four-dimensional, it is clear that either the three-dimensional or the four-
dimensional description of the world is the correct one in a sense that only
one of them correctly reflects the dimensionality of the world1. Also, physical
bodies are either three-dimensional or four-dimensional objects. Therefore,
not only is the question of the dimensionality of the world and the physical
objects not a non-issue, but it is one of the most fundamental issues of the
21st century physics. Moreover, it is natural to address the question of the
dimensionality of the world on the macroscopic scale according to relativity
1 Both the three- and four-dimensional descriptions of the world are correct in
terms of their adequate descriptions of the physical phenomena, but in terms of
the dimensionality of the world they cannot be both correct since the world is
not both three- and four-dimensional.
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first, before dealing with the reality of extra dimensions introduced by more
recent physical theories.
The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the analysis of the
kinematical effects of special relativity holds the key to answering the question
of the dimensionality of the world. It is shown that these effects and the ex-
periments which confirmed them would be impossible if the world were three-
dimensional. Section 2 shows that relativity of simultaneity, conventionality
of simultaneity, and the existence of accelerated observers in special relativity
would be impossible if the world were three-dimensional. Section 3 deals with
the dimensionality of physical objects and demonstrates that the relativistic
length contraction and the twin paradox would be impossible if the physical
bodies involved in these relativistic effects were three-dimensional objects.
2 Special relativity is impossible in a three-dimensional
world
Perhaps most physicists would disagree with the statement in the section title.
They would probably point out the well-known fact that special relativity was
initially formulated in a three-dimensional language. However, the only thing
this fact says is that the relativistic effects can be given a three-dimensional
description2; it says nothing about whether or not these effects would be
possible in a three-dimensional world.
The best way to prove the statement in the section title is to analyze
the kinematical effects of special relativity in order to reveal their true physi-
cal meaning. Such an analysis is especially needed since all physics books on
relativity merely describe the relativistic effects without addressing the ques-
tions of the dimensionality and existence of the physical objects involved in
these effects. Once those questions have been explicitly dealt with it becomes
evident, as we will see below, that the physical meaning of the kinematical
relativistic effects is profound – these effects turn out to be manifestations
of the four-dimensionality of the physical world. That is why they would be
impossible in a three-dimensional world.
2.1 Relativity of simultaneity is impossible in a three-dimensional
world
Let us start the analysis of relativity of simultaneity with the question “What
is the dimensionality of the world according to relativity?” As the observ-
able world is three-dimensional it is understandable why according to the
2 Obviously, a description itself does not tell anything about the dimensions of
what is described. For instance, the x − y plane can be described either in two-
dimensional or one-dimensional language (regarding the y dimension as a param-
eter).
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widely accepted view, called presentism, reality is also a three-dimensional
world which exists at the constantly changing present moment. But the di-
mensionality of the observable world tells us nothing about the dimensionality
of the world itself since the observable world is not what is real according to
the presentist view. It consists only of past events3 – the past light cone.
Therefore, the observable three-dimensional world does not constitute even
a three-dimensional world since such a world consists of all events that are
simultaneous at a given moment, whereas the observable world is a set of
events belonging to different moments of time (the more distant an event is
the more in the past it belongs).
If we assume that reality itself (not only the observable part of it) is also a
three-dimensional world, it can be easily shown that relativity of simultaneity
is impossible. As a three-dimensional world is defined as everything that exists
simultaneously at the present moment, it follows that the three dimensional
world (as the only existing entity) will be common to all observers4 in relative
3 “The key-word in relativity is event” [3, p. 105]. “An event marks a location
in spacetime” [4, p. 10]. In most relativity books ‘event’ is used as a synonym
of ‘worldpoint’ or ‘spacetime point’ [2, pp. 5-6], [5, p. 6], [6, p. 2-1, p. GL-4],
[7, p. 427], [8, p. 53], [9, p. 4], [10], [11, pp. 1, 9], [12, p. 25], [13], [14, p. 23],
[15], [16, p. 66]. This appears to be quite natural since an event, defined as a
worldpoint, is determined only by its space and time coordinates and is not asso-
ciated only with physical bodies or phenomena. The definition of a concept is of
course a matter of convention and, for example, one can define ‘event’ to mean
‘a worldpoint at which a physical object is located’. However, such a definition
invites a number of misconceptions. For instance, one is tempted to talk about
different events that happen with the same body. But since a body is implic-
itly regarded as a three-dimensional object it would mean that different events
happen with the same three-dimensional object, which makes no sense in rela-
tivity where a physical body is represented by a four-dimensional worldtube. A
worldtube, or simpler, a worldline consists of different worldpoints, which repre-
sent different three-dimensional objects. Therefore, to talk about different events
happening with the same three-dimensional body is clearly wrong in the frame-
work of relativity (but it is fine in the pre-relativistic physics). The same physical
body in relativity means the same four-dimensional object – the worldtube of the
body. The different events which constitute the worldtube involve different three-
dimensional objects – the physical body at different moments of its proper time.
In this paper I will use the widely accepted definition of event as a worldpoint, but
will make that definition more explicit – an event is defined as a three-dimensional
object, a field point, or a space point at a given moment of time [17, p. 56]. I
would like to stress specifically that all events of spacetime (like all points of any
dimensional space) have the same status of existence; otherwise, if the events of
just one three-dimensional hypersurface were existent, one could not talk about
spacetime at all.
4 “The word ‘observer’ is a shorthand way of speaking about the whole
collection of recording clocks associated with one free-float frame. No
one real observer could easily do what we ask of the ‘ideal observer’ in our analy-
sis of relativity. So it is best to think of the observer as a person who goes around
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motion; therefore they will have a common set of simultaneous events, which
means that relativity of simultaneity is indeed impossible. The conclusion that
relativity of simultaneity is possible only in a four-dimensional world seems un-
avoidable provided that existence is regarded as absolute (frame- or observer-
independent) – the observers in relative motion can have different sets of
simultaneous events only in a four- (or higher-) dimensional world; these sets
constitute different three-dimensional ‘cross-sections’ of such a world5. In this
sense relativity of simultaneity is a manifestation of the four-dimensionality
of the world.
The conclusion that relativity of simultaneity implies a four-dimensional
world looked unavoidable to Minkowski [1], Rietdijk [24], Putnam [25], Maxwell
[26], and to all who agree with the above argument6. However, one can for-
mulate three objections to the relativity of simultaneity argument.
The first objection was raised by Stein [30, 31]. He pointed out that the
relativity of simultaneity argument was flawed since it employed the pre-
relativistic concept of distant present events, whereas according to the rel-
ativistic division of events into past, present, and future one can attribute
presentness only to a single event (Fig. 1). The relativity of simultaneity ar-
gument is clearly based on the pre-relativistic view on reality that only the
present, defined as the three-dimensional world at the present moment, is real.
However, the present is the set of distant present events – everything that ex-
ists simultaneously at the moment ‘now’. Therefore the argument that due
to relativity of simultaneity two observers in relative motion have different
presents, which is possible only in a four-dimensional world, does employ the
concept of distant present events.
reading out the memories of all recording clocks under his control. This is the
sophisticated sense in which we hereafter use the phrase ‘the observer measures
such-and such’.” [4, p. 39] (see also [6, p. 1-18]). The concept ‘observer’ (or ‘ex-
perimenter’ [7, p. 428]) is widely used in relativity [8, p. 95], [12, p. 48], [14, p.
23], [16, p. 67] [18] in many cases as a synonym of ‘reference frame’ [11, p. 2],
[20]-[23]. If during an experiment the observer is located at the origin of an in-
ertial reference frame, which has been constructed in the standard way (see for
instance [9, p. 6]), then there is no difference between ‘observer’ and ‘reference
frame’.
5 As sometimes physicists and philosophers are inclined to think that the three-
dimensionalist view can somehow be made consistent with the relativistic picture
of the world they should obviously explain how relativity of simultaneity is pos-
sible in a three-dimensional world, which by definition contains just one set of
simultaneous events, whereas two observers in relative motion have different sets
of simultaneous events.
6 Einstein himself [27], Weyl [28], Weingard [29], and a number of physicists
and philosophers of science view relativity as clearly supporting the four-
dimensionalist view. In 1952 Einstein wrote: “It appears... more natural to think
of physical reality as a four-dimensional existence, instead of, as hitherto, the
evolution of a three-dimensional existence” [27].
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P
Fig. 1. In relativity the division of events into past and future is with respect to
one event, which is considered present.
Due to the fact that the three-dimensional world is the set of all distant
present events Stein’s objection is in fact directed against the view that reality
is a three-dimensional world [17, p. 123], [32]. Thus, by demonstrating that
the concept of distant present events (and therefore the view that the world is
three-dimensional) contradicts special relativity, Stein de facto sharply raised
the question of the dimensionality of the world according to relativity but did
not address it.
The same objection is also raised by Ohanian [33]: “[I]n relativistic physics
there is no absolute time, and no physical meaning can be attached to simul-
taneity at different locations.” That is precisely the case, since “in special
relativity, the causal structure of space-time defines a notion of a ‘light cone’
of an event, but does not define a notion of simultaneity” [34]. But the crucial
question is “What is the physical meaning of the relativistic fact that ‘no phys-
ical meaning can be attached to simultaneity at different locations’?” As we
have seen the immediate implication is obvious – the world cannot be three-
dimensional since it is defined as everything (at different locations) that exists
simultaneously at a given moment. If reality were a three-dimensional world,
then a clear physical meaning had to be attached to simultaneity at different
locations – a class of events (at different locations) would be simultaneous
because it is only these events that are real at the present moment. Ohanian
did not explicitly rule out the three-dimensionality of the world. Instead he
took a careful position: “The physical world inhabits this 4-D spacetime, but
the physical world does not occupy all of spacetime – it occupies only a sub-
space of spacetime. The dimension of the physical world is the dimension of
this occupied subspace. It is obvious that this occupied subspace is at least
3-D.” It turns out, however, that this view is inconsistent with relativity for
the following two reasons:
• If the physical world is represented by a three-dimensional subspace of
spacetime, the contradiction with relativity, as we have seen, is inescapable
– the set of simultaneous events, which constitute the three-dimensional
world, would be common to all observers in relative motion and there-
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fore no relativity of simultaneity would be possible. Even if the three-
dimensional physical world is regarded as somehow ‘more existent’ than
the remaining part of spacetime, relativity of simultaneity would again be
impossible – what is ‘more existent’ for one observer must be also ‘more
existent’ for all other observers in relative motion with respect to the first
one which means that simultaneity would be absolute. An assumption
that every observer has his own set of ‘more existent’ simultaneous events
amounts to a relativization of existence which, as we will see below, con-
tradicts relativistic facts which are not based on relativity of simultaneity.
• If the physical world occupies not all of spacetime, but a four-dimensional
subspace of it – the acausal spacetime region outside of the light cone at
an event (Fig. 1) – it immediately follows that the events in the past and
future light cone are as real as the events lying outside of the light cone
[29]. To see this assume that the physical world is represented by all events
lying outside of the light cone at event P (Fig. 2), i.e. all events that are
not causally related to P . On this view the events in the past and the
future light cone are not real. But if we consider a second light cone at
event P ′, most of the past and future events associated with the first light
cone lie, as seen in Fig. 2, in the spacetime region outside of the second
light cone and are therefore real. As for any event P the division of events
into past and future is invariant (since it is an intrinsic, absolute feature of
spacetime), it follows that what is real for an observer at P ′ should be real
for an observer at P as well. Therefore if one starts with the assumption
that the physical world is the spacetime region outside of the light cone at
an event, it does follow that the physical world is represented by all events
of spacetime.
P
P'
Fig. 2. If one assumes that only the events lying outside of the light cone at P are
real, by the same argument the events lying in the area outside of the light cone at
P ′ (which contains most of the events of the past and future events of the light cone
at P ) are also real and therefore all events of spacetime are real.
The second objection against the relativity of simultaneity argument is
based on the conventionality of simultaneity, which itself follows from the
(invariant) relativistic division of events into past, present, and future (Fig.
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1). Weingard [29] was the first to raise this objection7 against the relativity
of simultaneity argument used by Putnam [25]. Ohanian’s formulation of this
objection is [33]:
Any of the hypersurfaces in the 4-D acausal region between the
absolute past and future regions can be regarded as an equal-time hy-
persurface for the point P, provided that the surface includes the point
P and that every point on the surface is in the acausal region of every
other point on the surface (that is, the surface is “spacelike”). Thus, in
relativistic physics there is no unique, physically distinguished defini-
tion of simultaneity. To decide what is simultaneous, we need to adopt
some prescription for the construction of equal-time hypersurfaces, or,
equivalently, a procedure for clock synchronization. Simultaneity then
becomes a matter of convention, without any direct physical signifi-
cance.
As seen from the quote this objection is an elaboration of the first one
since it emphasizes that no three-dimensional hypersurface in the spacetime
region outside of the light cone at a given event is in any way physically dis-
tinguishable from the other hypersurfaces in the same spacetime region. This
means that no hypersurface is privileged on account of its being associated
with a single three-dimensional world, which is a set of distant present events;
if reality were a three-dimensional world, then the hypersurface associated
with it would be naturally privileged. That is what relativity tells us, but
again the crucial question is “What is the physical meaning of the relativistic
fact that ‘simultaneity becomes a matter of convention, without any direct
physical significance’?”
Like in the case of the first objection an immediate implication from that
relativistic fact is that the physical world cannot be three-dimensional. If the
world were three-dimensional it would be represented by one hypersurface (a
set of simultaneous events) that is physically distinguishable8 from the other
hypersurfaces in the spacetime region outside of the light cone at event P ,
which is not the case. A second argument is the following – since one is free
to choose which hypersurface to regard as a set of simultaneous events at P ,
which means that simultaneity is a matter of convention, it follows that what
exists would be also a matter of convention if reality were a three-dimensional
world (defined as the set of simultaneous events at a given moment) [29],
[35]. Although this argument against the three-dimensionality of the world
looks quite convincing (since what exists does not depend on our free choice)
it seems not everyone agrees with it. For instance, Ohanian [33] offers the
7 Despite criticizing Putnam for his conclusion that relativity of simultaneity im-
plies a four-dimensional world Weingard arrived at the same conclusion on the
basis of conventionality of simultaneity.
8 It would be physically distinguishable merely because there would be just one
hypersurface that represents the single three-dimensional world that exists.
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following counter-argument: “[I]f the 3-D world is unobservable, I am content
to fix it by convention.” If what exists is a three-dimensional world it is indeed
unobservable at the moment it exists, but does this mean that its existence
depends in any way on our choice?
Although viewing reality as a three-dimensional world directly contradicts
relativity (since such a view implies that a hypersurface in the spacetime re-
gion lying outside of the light cone at an event is physically distinguished),
let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that reality is indeed a single
three-dimensional world represented by a hypersurface that is orthogonal to
the worldtube of an inertial observer. This means that the Einsteinian syn-
chronization of distant clocks has been used (i.e. the back and forth velocities
of light have been taken to be equal). In this case we will have the ordinary rel-
ativistic effects (relativity of simultaneity, length contraction, time dilation,
etc.). The experiments designed to test these effects have confirmed them.
Let us now choose a non-Einsteinian synchronization of distant clocks, which
would mean that the hypersurface representing the three-dimensional world
would not be orthogonal to the worldtube of the inertial observer and the back
and forth velocities of light would not be equal. All relativistic effects would be
again derived, but the expressions for length contraction and time dilation, for
instance, would be more complicated [36]. If we decide to perform an experi-
ment to test length contraction, we should expect that it would confirm either
the expression derived on the basis of the Einsteinian synchronization of dis-
tant clocks or the expression employing the non-Einsteinian synchronization.
The reason for this expectation is clear – the hypersurface that represents
the existing three-dimensional world would either intersect the worldtube of
the measured meter stick at a given angle (‘cutting off’ a three-dimensional
meter stick of a given length) or at a different angle (‘cutting off’ another
three-dimensional meter stick of a different length). Thus, the fundamental
belief that what exists does not depend on our choice has observational conse-
quences if the world is three-dimensional. It should be stressed that if reality
were a three-dimensional world the experiment would confirm only one of the
expressions for length contraction.
However, if we perform that experiment it would confirm both expressions
for length contraction. Does this mean that it is we who decide whether or not
the hypersurface representing a three-dimensional world would be orthogonal
to the worldtube of the inertial observer? Yes, it does, but not because we can
fix the three-dimensional world by convention. The reason is that the physi-
cal meaning of conventionality of simultaneity also turns out to be profound.
Simultaneity can be a matter of convention ‘without any direct physical sig-
nificance’ only if the spacetime region outside of a light cone at an event exists
as a whole. In this case conventionality of simultaneity is trivial (with no phys-
ical significance) simply because the whole four-dimensional region exists and
we are free to choose any hypersurface in it (because we have from where to
choose!). But as we have seen, the existence of the spacetime region outside of
the light cone implies the existence of the whole spacetime. Thus, convention-
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ality of simultaneity is possible only if spacetime is a real four-dimensional
entity. If reality were a three-dimensional world, simultaneity would be abso-
lute and no conventionality would be possible – in that case there would exist
just one three-dimensional world (a single set of simultaneous events) and one
would not have from where to choose his three-dimensional world.
The third objection against the relativity of simultaneity argument is more
philosophical in nature. It calls for the relativization of existence. As men-
tioned above, the relativity of simultaneity argument implicitly regards exis-
tence as absolute – having different sets of simultaneous events two observers
in relative motion have different three-dimensional worlds which means that
both three-dimensional worlds must exists for every observer (existence is
absolute!). But this is only possible in a four-dimensional world. The objec-
tion is: “Why should existence be absolute? Relativity relativized motion,
simultaneity, and now it is the turn of existence to be relativized. If this
is done, each of the observers in relative motion would claim that only his
three-dimensional world would exist and would deny the existence of the
three-dimensional worlds of the other observers. This relativized version of
the three-dimensionalist view preserves the three-dimensionality of the world
but is undefendable for the following reasons:
• It is in obvious contradiction with relativity since the three-dimensional
world of an observer would be represented by a hypersurface (a set of dis-
tant present event) lying outside of the light cone, which would be phys-
ically distinguished from the other hypersurfaces in the same spacetime
region.
• The relativization of existence is based on relativity of simultaneity and has
no justification in relativistic situations where no relativity of simultaneity
is involved. Moreover, as we will see below, the relativized version of the
three-dimensionalist view, which regards the world and the physical ob-
jects as three-dimensional, is in direct contradiction with conventionality
of simultaneity, the existence of accelerated observers in special relativity,
and the twin paradox.
2.2 Conventionality of simultaneity is impossible in a
three-dimensional world
We have seen that conventionality of simultaneity is a consequence of the rela-
tivistic division of events into past, present, and future (Fig. 1) – any observer
at event P is free to choose which hypersurface lying outside of the light cone
at P can be regarded by him as the set of events that are simultaneous for
him at P . As discussed above the profound physical meaning of this freedom
is that the whole four-dimensional spacetime region outside of the light cone
at P must exist. That is why – because it exists – we can choose different
hypersurfaces from it. Otherwise, if reality were a three-dimensional world no
such freedom in choosing different hypersurfaces, representing different three-
dimensional worlds, would be possible.
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One may be left with the impression that it is the four-dimensional rep-
resentation of special relativity and particularly the concept of a light cone,
which demonstrated that conventionality of simultaneity is impossible in a
three-dimensional world. Moreover, it is generally believed that the four-
dimensional picture of the world itself became possible only after Minkowski’s
talk on space and time [1] in 1908. In fact, that picture is logically contained in
the original formulation of special relativity by Einstein in 1905. Minkowski
was the first to realize that the relativistic effects are manifestations of a
world of higher dimensions – a four-dimensional world with time being the
extra dimension. That is why he pointed out that the essence of special rel-
ativity is not relativity of space, time, and other physical quantities as the
principle of relativity had been interpreted to mean in the early years of spe-
cial relativity. According to Minkowski that principle should be replaced by
‘the postulate of the absolute world ’ [1, p. 83] since a rigorous analysis of the
physical meaning of the relativity principle reveals that reality is an absolute
(frame-independent) four-dimensional world.
And indeed if we explicitly address the question of the physical meaning of
the relativistic effects (assuming that we do it, say, in 1906) it does become ev-
ident that these effects are manifestations of the four-dimensionality of world.
We have seen this in the case of relativity of simultaneity – once the key role
of simultaneity in the definition of a three-dimensional world has been taken
into account the conclusion that relativity of simultaneity is impossible in a
three-dimensional world is inescapable. In the next section we will see that
length contraction and the twin paradox are manifestations of the reality of
the four-dimensional worldtubes of the objects involved in these effects. But
now we will first show how the conclusion that conventionality of simultaneity
is impossible in a three-dimensional world could have been reached in 1906.
In the section ‘Definition of Simultaneity’ of his 1905 paper Einstein dis-
cussed the introduction of a common time at two distant points A and B:
“We have not defined a common ‘time’ for A and B, for the latter cannot be
defined at all unless we establish by definition that the ‘time’ required by light
to travel from A to B equals the ‘time’ it requires to travel from B to A” [37,
p. 40]. This conclusion is a result of a deep analysis and shows that Einstein
had re-discovered, after Poincare´,9 the unavoidable conventionality in deter-
mining the one-way velocity of light and the simultaneity of distant events.
However, that conclusion raises the obvious question “How can the one-way
velocity of light be a matter of definition (convention), whereas it appears
to be self-evident that in reality the back and forth velocities of light are ei-
ther the same or not the same?” Had Einstein pursued further his analysis he
would have most probably arrived at the conclusion that the impossibility to
9 In 1898 Poincare´ first realized that it was a postulate that the light “velocity
is the same in all directions” and that “[t]his postulate could never be verified
directly by experiment” [38, p. 220]. Poincare´ also arrived at the conclusion that
whether two events are simultaneous is a matter of convention [38, p. 222].
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determine the one-way velocity of light had a profound reason – reality is a
four-dimensional world in which light (and anything else) does not travel at
all since the whole history of a light signal is entirely realized in the (forever
given) light signal’s worldline.
Let us outline the way that analysis could have been performed. Undoubt-
edly, Einstein had realized the vicious circle when one tries to establish the
simultaneity of distant events, that is, to synchronize distant clocks, with the
help of light signals – to synchronize two clocks at different locations the one-
way velocity of light between them should be known, but to determine the
one-way velocity of light the two clocks should be synchronized beforehand.
A synchronization by a slow transport of a third clock also leads to the same
vicious circle. To see the vicious circle here, one should keep in mind that
the third clock’s velocity cannot be assumed to be zero; otherwise, it would
obviously not be able to reach the clock it is trying to synchronize. No matter
how small, the velocity of the third clock is different from zero, which means
that the time dilation effect (no matter how small) should be taken into ac-
count. To calculate that effect the one-way velocity of the third clock should
be known, but in order to determine it the two clocks, which the third clock
tries to synchronize, should be synchronized in advance.
Thus, the vicious circle in determining the one-way velocity of light and
therefore the simultaneity of distant events is unavoidable. Then the natural
question is what message that vicious circle conveys. The deep meaning of
the message becomes evident when the impossibility to determine objectively
which distant events are simultaneous is analyzed in terms of what exists.
Assume that reality is a three-dimensional world (everything that exists si-
multaneously at the present moment). As simultaneity of distant events is
a matter of convention it follows that the three-dimensional world is also a
matter of convention. But what exists, no matter that it is unobservable at
the moment it exists, cannot be a matter of convention. Thus, the only con-
clusion which one can draw from here is that conventionality of simultaneity
is impossible in a three-dimensional world10 (and that conclusion could have
been reached before the four-dimensional formulation of special relativity was
given in 1908).
Had Einstein arrived at the conclusion that simultaneity of distant events
would not be established ‘by definition’ if reality were a three-dimensional
world he would have faced quite a challenge. It is impossible to guess how
much time it would have taken him to decode the message conveyed by the
vicious circle and to realize that conventionality of simultaneity implies a
four-dimensional world in which space and time are united into an insepa-
rable entity. After the publication of his 1905 papers his intellectual power
10 Of course, the first reaction of anyone who arrives at this conclusion would most
probably be to question the validity of the conventionality thesis. However, no
matter how many times the analysis leading to the vicious circle would be repeated
its existence would be confirmed and the conventionality thesis would follow.
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had been concentrated on making the description of gravity consistent with
special relativity. Thus, it appears that the development of general relativity
had prevented him from dealing with the question of the physical meaning
of our freedom to define which events in the world are simultaneous. What
confirms that Einstein had not pursued his analysis of the conventionality
of simultaneity further is his initial negative reaction to Minkowski’s four-
dimensional formulation of special relativity. However, the man who was not
afraid to ask fundamental questions and to seek their answers, the man who
discovered the unimaginable at that time link between gravity and geometry,
would have definitely been able to decode the message hidden in the vicious
circle involved in any attempt to determine which events are simultaneous, if
he had had the time. Most probably, Einstein would have realized that our
freedom to choose our three-dimensional world (the set of simultaneous events
at the moment ‘now’) implies that we have from where to choose. Then ar-
riving at the idea that there is a link between conventionality of simultaneity
and dimensionality of the world would not have been so unthinkable.
Once it is realized that reality is a four-dimensional world conventionality
of simultaneity turns out to be trivial – as all events of spacetime are equally
existent it is really our choice which events constituting a three-dimensional
hypersurface (lying outside of the light cone at a given event) will be re-
garded as simultaneous. In such a four-dimensional world in which there are
only worldlines of particles and light signals the velocity of light is just a de-
scription of light worldlines in terms of our three-dimensional language since
in reality (in spacetime) light does not travel at all. If the world were three-
dimensional and light were really propagating, its one-way velocity could not
be conventional because Nature would ‘know’ what is the magnitude of that
velocity.
The realization that conventionality of simultaneity is another manifesta-
tion of the four-dimensionality of the world is in fact an argument against any
attempt to relativize existence since such a view would preserve the three-
dimensionality of the world.
2.3 The existence of accelerated observers in special relativity is
impossible in a three-dimensional world
In the early years of special and general relativity there had been some confu-
sion about accelerated motion – for some time, due to Einstein’s equivalence
principle, there had been a tendency to think that it is general relativity which
deals with accelerated motion. Gradually, however, the issue has been settled
and in the early seventies Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler even entitled one
of the sections of their Gravitation “Accelerated observers can be analyzed
using special relativity” [5, p. 163]. Now the situation is completely clear –
general relativity describes curved spacetimes, whereas special relativity is
concerned with a flat spacetime. Absolutely accelerated observers [17, Ch. 8],
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which are represented by non-geodesic worldlines, exist in both curved and
flat spacetimes.
Worldtube of an accelerating observer
Observer's present at N
Observer's present at M
M
N
Light cone
? H
Fig. 3. At any moment of his proper time an accelerated observer has a set of simul-
taneous events (his present at that moment). Unlike an inertial observer’s presents
the presents of the accelerated observer intersect one another.
So, accelerated observers are described by special relativity, but that would
not be possible if reality were a three-dimensional world. To see why this is so
assume that what exists is only the present, i.e. the three-dimensional world
at the moment ‘now’, and consider an accelerated observer whose worldtube
is depicted in Fig. 3. Due to the fact that the worldtube of the accelerated
observer is curved the presents that correspond to the different moments of
his proper time are not parallel and intersect one another as shown in Fig. 3.
Consider the accelerated observer’s presents that correspond to the events M
and N . At event M the spacetime region between the two presents denoted
by the question mark “?” is past for the accelerated observer (including part
of his present at the later event N). However, the same spacetime region lies
in the future of the accelerated observer at the later event N (including part
of his present at the earlier event M). Obviously, this would be impossible if
the world were three-dimensional. Thus, the existence of accelerated observers
in special relativity is another manifestation of the four-dimensionality of the
world and is therefore an argument against the view that existence should be
relativized because this view regards the world as three-dimensional.
Almost certainly a physicist would object to the above argument by point-
ing out that there are constrains on the size of an accelerating frame in rel-
ativity [5, p. 168]. These constrains result from the fact that a coordinate
system associated with the accelerated observer cannot be extended to the
left in Fig. 3 beyond event H. The first objection against using a global co-
ordinate system in the case of an accelerated observer was mentioned above
– coordinate time makes no sense beyond event H because what is past time
at event M (in the region “?”) is future time at the later event N . A second
objection is the fact that the coordinates of events located in the spacetime
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region between the past and future light cones, which contains the region “?”,
cannot be determined by sending and receiving light signals [5, p. 168]. The
event H (in fact, a two-dimensional surface) acts as a horizon for the accel-
erated observer – no signals can be received from and sent to the spacetime
region lying to the left of that event.
All this is correct, but the above two objections are concerned only with the
description of the events of spacetime and have nothing to do with the question
of whether or not they exist. That the impossibility for an accelerated observer
to communicate with events located to the left of event H (between the past
and future light cone at H) has no effect on the existence of these events
is best demonstrated by the fact that all comoving inertial observers at the
different events of the worldtube of the accelerated observer can communicate
with those events. And if they exist for the comoving inertial observers they
should exist for the accelerated observer as well.
It should be noted here that the relativistic division of events into past,
present, and future (Fig. 1), which defines the notion of a light cone, reveals
only the causal structure of spacetime and has no relation to the existence of
the spacetime events11. As we have seen above if one assumes that the events
located outside of the light cone at an event exist it is easily shown that all
spacetime events exist.
3 Physical objects are four-dimensional worldtubes
In this section we will be concerned with the dimensionality of the objects
involved in the relativistic effects. This issue was dealt with in more detail in
[17, Ch. 5]. Here I will discuss the relativistic length contraction by addressing
Ohanian’s objections [33] to the account given in [17] and the twin paradox
by examining another version of it that rules out the acceleration as a cause
for the time difference observed by the twins when they meet.
3.1 Length contraction would be impossible if the contracting
meter stick were a three-dimensional object
It is unfortunate that the physics papers and books on relativity do not discuss
the issue of the dimensionality of the objects subjected to relativistic effects.
As discussed in the Introduction the most probable explanation might be
that that issue is regarded by physicists as philosophical. However, I wonder
how many physicists, if directly asked, would subscribe to the view that the
dimensionality of physical objects (and the world) is a philosophical question.
If the dimensionality issue is explicitly addressed, not only the description,
but a full explanation of these effects can be achieved. Take as an example
length contraction. Consider a meter stick at rest with respect to an observer
11 One can think of a four-dimensional world with no causal structure.
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Fig. 4. A meter stick, whose end points’ worldlines are represented by the thick
lines, is at rest with respect to observer A. The instantaneous space of observer B
at event P intersects the worldtube of the meter stick in a three-dimensional cross-
section, whose length is shorter than the cross-section ‘cut off’ by the instantaneous
space of observer A. If one assumes that only the part of the meter stick’s worldtube
which lies in the spacetime region outside of the light cone at P is real, then by the
same argument the worldtube’s parts that are in the past and future light cone at
P are also real since they lie outside of a second light cone at P ′.
A (Fig. 4). A second observer B moving relative to A finds that the length of
the meter stick is relativistically contracted. The natural question is “What is
the physical meaning of the relativistic length contraction?” Physicists usually
avoid addressing it by pointing out that what a physicist should be concerned
with is its derivation through the Lorentz transformations. Although many
physicists believe that the ultimate goal of physics is understanding of the
real world (and do not share this purely descriptive role of physics), it is
worth noting here that the very derivation of this effect from the Lorentz
transformations involves an overlooked subtlety12 [17, pp. 94-97] which clearly
raises the question of the physical meaning of length contraction. This subtlety
12 The subtlety involves an unusual use of the Lorentz transformations in the deriva-
tion of length contraction. Instead of performing what appears to be the correct
transformation A ⇒ B (which expresses the unknown in frame B coordinates
of the end points of the meter stick as a function of their known in frame A
coordinates) this effect is derived through the transformation B ⇒ A, i.e. by
expressing the known coordinates of the meter stick’s end points through their
unknown coordinates. The requirement that the end points of the meter stick
should be measured simultaneously in B cannot be used as a justification for
the transformation B ⇒ A since the transformation A ⇒ B also ensures the
simultaneity of the events of the measurement in B [17, p. 95]. (For comparison
consider a process that takes place at a point in A and has a duration tA in A.
In order to determine its relativistically dilated duration tB in B, observer B
performs the ‘correct’ Lorentz transformation A⇒ B, not B ⇒ A.) The Lorentz
transformation B ⇒ A gives the correct length contraction because it is only this
transformation that relates the end points of two three-dimensional cross-section
of the worldtube of the meter stick; the transformation A⇒ B does not link pairs
of events that constitute cross-sections of the meter stick’s worldtube. This fact
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implies that the meter stick is not a three-dimensional object, but a four-
dimensional worldtube – the three-dimensional meter stick equally existing at
all moments of its history. As a result, while measuring the same meter stick
the two observers measure two different three-dimensional objects, which are
different three-dimensional cross-sections of the meter stick’s worldtube. This
is shown in Fig. 4. The instantaneous spaces of A and B ‘cut off’ different
three-dimensional cross-sections from the worldtube of the meter stick and
A’s cross-section, representing the proper length of the meter stick, turns out
to be the longest of all possible cross-sections. Thus, the realization that what
we perceive as a three-dimensional meter stick is in fact a four-dimensional
worldtube provides a 100% explanation13 of the relativistic length contraction
– the instantaneous space of B intersects the meter stick’s worldtube in a
three-dimensional cross-section which is different from and shorter than the
cross-section of A.
A possible objection to this ‘a 100% explanation’ of the relativistic length
contraction is that one should not take the spacetime time diagram shown
in Fig. 4 too seriously. First, it is the analysis of the derivation of this effect
which demonstrates that what is depicted in Fig. 4 adequately represents the
dimensionality of the meter stick. Second, the conclusion that A and B mea-
sure two different three-dimensional objects follows directly from relativity of
simultaneity when it is taken into account that the meter stick as an extended
body is defined as the set of its ‘parts’ which exist simultaneously at a given
moment. Since the observers A and B are in relative motion they have dif-
ferent sets of simultaneous events and therefore different three-dimensional
meter sticks. It is evident from here that the worldtube of the meter stick
must be real in order that A and B consider different three-dimensional cross-
sections of it as their three-dimensional meter sticks. Otherwise, if the meter
stick were what everyone is tempted to assume as self-evident – a single three-
dimensional object – (just A’s meter stick), no length contraction would be
possible because that single three-dimensional object would constitute a sin-
gle set of simultaneous events, which would be common to all observers in
relative motion in contradiction with special relativity.
Here, one could again raise the objection that the conclusion of the reality
of the meter stick’s worldtube is based on relativity of simultaneity, whereas
one is free to choose any hypersurface in the spacetime region outside of
the light cone at event P (Fig. 4). However, like in the general case of the
implies that the worldtube of the meter stick is a real four-dimensional object; if
this were not the case than the transformation A⇒ B would be used which would
lead to internal inconsistencies in special relativity and ultimately to contradic-
tions with experiments that confirmed the relativistic length contraction (e.g. the
muon experiment, which tested both time dilation and length contraction [39]).
13 I call it ‘a 100% explanation’ since it is not based on any other explicit or implicit
assumptions. If the worldtube of the meter stick is real, that is all – it completely
explains the physical meaning of length contraction. The ‘if’ is convincingly re-
moved as we will see below.
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dimensionality of the world discussed in Section 2 this objection is, in fact,
directed against the view that the meter stick is a three-dimensional object
since a three-dimensional object is defined in terms of simultaneity14. The
freedom to choose any hypersurface which lies outside of the light cone, i.e.
the freedom to choose any cross-section of the meter stick’s worldtube outside
of the light cone, means that the part of the worldtube (depicted with thick
lines) located outside of the light cone must be real in order to have from
where to choose. The rest of the meter stick’s worldtube (represented by the
dashed lines) which lies in the past and the future light cone at P must also
be real since it is outside of another light cone associated with event P ′ (Fig.
4).
Thus, the conclusion that the worldtube of the meter stick is a real four-
dimensional object is inescapable. To realize this even better let us ask the
question “What is the dimensionality of the meter stick itself (not what we
see or measure15)?” Obviously, there are only three possibilities for the di-
mensionality of the meter stick: (i) a three-dimensional object, (ii) part of the
worldtube of the meter stick which lies outside of the light cone at event P
(Fig. 4), and (iii) the entire worldtube of the meter stick. As we have seen
above (i) contradicts relativity, whereas (ii) leads to (iii):
• If the meter stick is a three-dimensional object (at rest with respect to
observer A) relativity of simultaneity is impossible since it follows from
relativity of simultaneity that A and B measure two different three-
dimensional objects, which is only possible if the meter stick’s worldtube
exists.
• If the meter stick is the part of its worldtube which lies outside of the light
cone at P then it follows that the entire worldtube of the meter stick is
real since the parts of the worldtube that lie in the past and future light
14 The fact that no intrinsic (therefore frame-independent) feature of spacetime can
be associated with the notion ‘simultaneity in spacetime’, i.e. with the notion
‘distant present events’, demonstrates that the concept of a three-dimensional
object (which is defined in terms of simultaneity) has no place in relativity. This
conclusion appears to be in such an obvious contradiction with our common sense
view on physical objects that the status of three-dimensional objects in relativity
has been avoided so far.
15 What the observers A and B see when they meet momentarily at P (Fig. 4) is the
same three-dimensional cross-section of the meter stick’s worldtube of the same
length, but it does not constitute a three-dimensional object since that image
is the intersection of the past light cone with the worldtube of the meter stick,
whereas a three-dimensional object is the collection of all ‘parts’ of the object that
exist simultaneously at a given moment of an observer’s time [32]. A thought ex-
periment [17, p. 137] involving instantaneous measurements demonstrates that
two observers in relative motion do measure two different three-dimensional ob-
jects. Thus, not only the theoretical prediction of relativistic length contraction
would not be possible but any experiments that test this effect would be also
impossible if the meter stick’s worldtube were not real.
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cone at P (and therefore are regarded as non-existent for an observer at
P ) lie outside of another light cone at P ′ and therefore are regarded as
existent for an observer at P ′ (Fig. 4).
As we have seen not only does the assumption that the worldtube of the
meter stick is real provide a natural and complete explanation of the rel-
ativistic length contraction, but also that explanation is the only one that
is consistent with relativity itself. A striking feature of this explanation is
that it is not dynamical since it turns out to be a manifestation of the four-
dimensionality of the world and in particular a manifestation of the fact that
the meter stick itself is a four-dimensional worldtube, not a three-dimensional
object. However, the assumption of the reality of the worldtube of the meter
stick is so counter-intuitive that after the original Lorentz-FitzGerald explana-
tion of the length contraction effect, which involved a deformation of the meter
stick caused by forces acting on its atoms, there have always been attempts to
provide a dynamical explanation of the relativistic length contraction which
should account for the deformation of the meter stick (see for example [33],
[40], [41]). Such an explanation, however, is in an insurmountable contradic-
tion with relativity of simultaneity since it presupposes that two observers
in relative motion have a common set of simultaneous events – the observers
measure the length of the same three-dimensional object, i.e. the same set of
simultaneous events, which constitute the meter stick.
Another argument which demonstrates the failure of any dynamical ex-
planation of the relativistic length contraction is the fact that such an expla-
nation cannot account for the contraction of space itself where there are no
atoms and forces acting between them [17, pp. 135-136]. However, Ohanian
[33] disagrees with this argument16: “If the length contraction represents any-
thing physical, it must be a contraction of physical bodies, not a ‘contraction
16 Ohanian also writes: “We could, in principle, do physics in the manner of Lorentz,
in one single coordinate system (what Lorentz called the ether frame)” [33]. This
could not be done since relativity of simultaneity and reciprocity of length con-
traction and time dilation require two inertial frames. Otherwise one could not
talk about proper length (in the rest frame) and contracted length (in a frame
moving relative to the rest frame) and about proper time and dilated time (which
again require two frames). Lorentz himself admitted the failure of his attempt to
use just one frame (the ether frame) in which the coordinates x, y, z, and t were
the true coordinates, whereas the quantities x′, y′, z′ and t′ were nothing more
than mathematical quantities [42]:
The chief cause of my failure was my clinging to the idea that the variable
t only can be considered as the true time and that my local time t′ must be
regarded as no more than an auxiliary mathematical quantity. In Einstein’s
theory, on the contrary, t′ plays the same part as t; if we want to describe
phenomena in terms of x′, y′, z′, t′ we must work with these variables exactly
as we could do with x, y, z, t.
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of space’´’. I do not think this objection can be defended in the framework
of relativity. Nowhere in special relativity there is any requirement that the
Lorentz transformations must be applied to physical bodies only. The distance
between two points of space contracts17 relativistically as well. Otherwise, if
only physical bodies contracted, one would arrive at the following paradoxical
result (which can be found in some explanations of the geometry on a rotat-
ing disk). Consider the distance LMN between two points M and N in space,
say the distance between two objects at rest with respect to an observer A.
Using a meter stick A determines that LMN = 10 m. A second observer B
moving relative to A applies the Lorentz transformations only to the physical
meter stick and concludes that due to its relativistic contraction more meter
sticks will fit between the points M and N and as a result the distance LMN
will be greater that 10 m, i.e. it will be relativistically dilated for B, not con-
tracted. One can arrive at more paradoxical results if the assumption that
only physical bodies contract is carefully analyzed.
3.2 The twin paradox would be impossible if the twins were
three-dimensional bodies
The best way to prove the statement in the section title is to accept for a
moment the common view on the dimensionality of physical bodies and as-
sume that each of the twins A and B, represented by their worldtubes in Fig.
5, is a three-dimensional body that exists only at the moment ‘now’ of the
proper time of the twin. On this view the twins’ worldtubes are not real four-
dimensional objects; these are nothing more than graphical representations
of the twins’ histories, which do not have counterparts in the external world.
On the three-dimensionalist view time flows objectively which means that any
discrepancy in the readings of the twins’ clocks results from a different ‘rate’
of the twins’ times. When A and B meet at event M they will determine that
twin B is, say, five years younger than his brother. As the twins exist as three-
dimensional bodies only at M the only explanation of the five-year difference
in their times is an objective slowing down of B’s time. The spacetime ex-
planation that B’s worldtube is shorter18 than A’s worldtube cannot be used
since we started with the assumption that the twins exist as three-dimensional
bodies, not worldtubes.
The only cause for the slowing down of twin B’s time could be the acceler-
ation to which he is subjected four times during his journey – acceleration at
D when he departs, deceleration at T when he stops to turn back, acceleration
at T on his way back to twin A, and final deceleration when he stops to meet
17 And that distance can be measured by light signals, not only by physical bodies
(meter sticks).
18 In Fig. 5 twin B’s worldtube is longer but this is due to the fact that a situation
in the pseudo-Euclidean Minkowski spacetime is represented on the Euclidean
surface of the paper.
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tB = tC = 5 y
tA = 5 y
tA = tB = tC = 0
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Fig. 5. Twins A and B, whose worldtubes are represented by the black lines, sepa-
rate at event D and meet at event M . A third twin C, whose worldtube is depicted
by the grey line, also departs at D and initially moves with B but at event T1 turns
back and after reaching A at event I departs again, intercepts B at event T2, turns
back and together with B meets A at event M .
his brother at M . However, it has been determined that acceleration does not
cause the time difference in A’s and B’s clocks’ readings at M by both (i) the
experiments (see [14, p. 83]) which tested the so-called ‘clock hypothesis’ [5,
p. 164], [11, p. 52], [20, p. 33] according to which the rate of an ideal clock is
not affected by its acceleration, and (ii) the three-clock (or three-twin) version
of the twin paradox (see, for instance, [43]). A third argument also involves a
third twin C (Fig. 5) who, however, is not inertial since he accelerates eight
times – at events D and M twin C has the same regime of acceleration as
twin B at these events, at events T1 and T2 his acceleration regime is as the
acceleration of B at T , and at event I twin C’s acceleration is a mirror im-
age of B’s acceleration at T . Despite that C experiences more instances of
acceleration, there will be again a five-year difference in A’s and C’s times
when he arrives at M . This shows that the acceleration does not cause any
slowing down of time. Therefore, in the case of the standard version of the
twin paradox B’s acceleration cannot be the cause for the slowing down of
his time, which means that his time flows at the same ‘rate’ as twin A’s time.
The conclusion is that at event M the twins will be of the same age. Thus,
the twin paradox would not be possible if the twins were three-dimensional
bodies which existed only at the present moments of the twins.
The same conclusion that A and B will be of equal age at M , if they are
three-dimensional bodies existing only at M , also follows from the fact that
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A and B measure proper times. When the twins meet at M they compare
their proper times [17, pp. 144-145], but the proper time does not change
relativistically. Therefore, if the twins existed only at the event M as three-
dimensional bodies the objective flow of A’s and B’s times (possible only in a
three-dimensional world) would be the same which means that the twins would
be of the same age atM . Thus, the twin paradox is impossible as a theoretical
and an experimental result if it is assumed that the twins’ worldtubes are not
real and the twins are the observable three-dimensional bodies that exist only
at the constantly changing present moments of the twins’ times. This results
also rules out any attempt to relativize the existence of physical bodies since
such a relativization of existence preserves the three-dimensionality of the
world and the physical bodies.
The only non-contradictory explanation19 of the twin paradox can be given
by acknowledging the existence of the twins’ worldtubes. Then this effect is
simply the triangle inequality in the pseudo-Euclidean Minkowski spacetime.
Twin B is younger than A atM since his worldtube between the events D and
M is shorter than A’s worldtube between the same events. This is also a 100%
explanation. It makes it evident why the acceleration is not the cause of the
time difference between A’s and B’s clock readings at M – in spacetime the
acceleration of a body is represented by a curvature of the body’s worldtube,
but a curvature does not change the length of a worldtube (i.e. a body’s
proper time). As seen in Fig. 5 the lengths of the worldtubes of twins B and
C between events D and M are the same (the segment T1I of C’s worldtube
is equal TT2 of B’s worldtube and IT2 of C’s worldtube is equal to T1T of
B’s worldtube). That is why B and C are of the same age at M .
Conclusions
The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the kinematical relativistic
effects are manifestations of the four-dimensionality of the world. As such
these effects would be impossible if the world were three-dimensional. This was
shown in the cases of relativity of simultaneity, conventionality of simultaneity,
accelerated observers in special relativity, length contraction, and the twin
paradox. Therefore, the concept of a three-dimensional world contradicts not
only special relativity (as a theory) but more importantly the experimental
evidence which supports it.
I would like specifically to stress that no appeal to quantum mechanics or
any future theories (e.g. quantum gravity) can change the fact of the contra-
diction of the three-dimensionalist view with the experiments which confirmed
the kinematical consequences of special relativity.
19 This relativistic effect was initially described in three-dimensional language. But
when the question of its physical meaning is raised it becomes evident that the
twin paradox is a manifestation of the reality of the twins’ worldtubes and the
four-dimensionality of the world.
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We are approaching the one hundredth anniversary of Minkowski’s talk
on spacetime, but the essence of the new world view he advocated has turned
out to be difficult to accept. That is why let me conclude with a quote from
Eddington [44]:
However successful the theory of a four dimensional world may be, it
is difficult to ignore a voice inside us which whispers: “At the back of
your mind, you know that a fourth dimension is all nonsense.” I fancy
that that voice must often have had a busy time in the past history
of physics. What nonsense to say that this solid table on which I am
writing is a collection of electrons moving with prodigious speeds in
empty spaces, which relatively to electronic dimensions are as wide as
the spaces between the planets in the solar system! What nonsense
to say that the thin air is trying to crush my body with a load of
14 lbs. to the square inch! What nonsense that the star cluster which
I see through the telescope obviously there now, is a glimpse into a
past age 50,000 years ago! Let us not be beguiled by this voice. It is
discredited.
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